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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3175-80
30 April 1980MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign AssessmentRichard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for WarningFROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE 25X1
(Meeting held on 22 April 1980) [REDACTED]

1. Afghanistan. Community analysts assessed the probability of the augmentation of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and agreed that there was no evidence of a large, near-term infusion of additional forces. "Large" was defined as on the order of 50% or more of those now in country. If such a force were being readied to be sent into Afghanistan, we believe we would have sufficient warning indicators and lead-time, due in part to the probability that low-strength divisions would be used and would oblige large reserve callups and other mobilization activity. Because the Soviets lack forces of this scale in the areas adjacent to Afghanistan, such activity would involve units garrisoned in other parts of the USSR. The Soviets, however, could move the two divisions now on the Afghan border into the country in very short order. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. Soviet Military Activity in the Transcaucasus. [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] military activity in the Transcaucasus military district over the past months have raised the preparedness level of forces there. These activities have included the cycling of some reservists through low-strength divisions, and the apparent upgrading of some equipment. [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] But there has been no build-up [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] that would signal an actual [REDACTED] 25X1
intention to move into Iran. Summarizing the results of these activities, OSR and DIA representatives agreed that the Soviets probably now have the capability to ready six to eight divisions to move into Iran in a short period of time. [REDACTED] 25X1

3. Iran/Iraq. Analysts discussed the question of a Soviet response to a substantial conflict between Iran and Iraq, and how such a conflict

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would impinge on Soviet interests. On balance, the judgment was that the Soviets would not welcome having to make a choice to support one side against the other. What action the Soviets might take in the event cannot be determined at this point. An important determinant of Soviet behavior under these circumstances would be Moscow's perceptions of the effects of such a conflict on Iranian stability. If it threatened to set in motion the fragmentation of Iran, the Soviets incentive to intervene in that country could be high.

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4. The PDRY. Analysts agreed that neither the Soviets' role, if any, in the replacement of Ismail, nor their perceptions of having lost or gained in the change of power, were clear. Preliminary judgments were that little change in PRDY-Soviet relations was to be expected. The Soviets have considerable leverage in the PDRY as a result of their military relationship with the country, and we cannot rule out a future Soviet move to influence the situation in their favor. The situation deserves to be watched closely.

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
5. Yugoslavia. The leadership has functioned well during the period of Tito's incapacitation, but there has been a good deal of political maneuvering behind the scenes. This has centered around Vladimir Bakaric. The attempt has been made to position Bakaric to assume the role of head of the Party Presidium, a move which the Serbian hierarchy of the Party Presidium apparently opposes. Despite this maneuvering, there has been no evidence of attempts to challenge existing institutions or to suggest that the formal rules of political behavior will not hold in the near-term. The position of Chairman of the Party Presidium becomes vacant in October. Tito has always appointed this individual and the October replacement could be the first issue of real contention in the leadership.

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6. Soviet-West European Relations. Soviet policies toward West Europe in the near-term will be designed to differentiate the West European states and their interests from the United States. The Soviets will continue to encourage detente -- for example, by expressions of interest in a European disarmament conference -- and the view that "differentiated detente" -- the development of cooperation with Europe even in the face of deteriorating US-Soviet relations -- is a realistic alternative for the Europeans. How receptive the Europeans will be to resuming a fuller dialogue with the USSR, and under what conditions, remains to be seen.

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